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can neither distinguish between target values nor is the protection conspicuous. Also, the ability of the terror cell to 
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1. Introduction 
 
Sandler (2005) defines terrorism as “the premeditated use or threat of use of violence by 
individuals or sub-national groups to obtain a political or social objective through intimidation 
of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims”.  Terrorists operate both within and 
across borders, attempting to leave a trail of death and destruction, in order to create a fear-
psychosis among people. It is therefore an endeavor of policy-makers and governments all over 
the world to restrict terrorism. For this purpose, they need to choose suitable counter-terrorism 
(CT) policies given their financial and operational constraints. 
 
The linkages of global terrorism with income and geography on the one hand, and with 
politico-economic structures and frameworks on the other, have been analyzed at some length. In 
the former category, Enders and Sandler (2006) apply an autoregressive intervention model on 
data spanning 1968-2003 and surprisingly find a lack of evidence of income-based relocation of 
terror strikes to low-income countries after 9/11, while Barth, Li and McCarthy (2006) find that 
terrorism adversely impacts overall economic activity. In the latter category, Li (2005) shows 
that democratic involvement inhibits transnational terrorism, while Sandler and Siqueira (2007)1 
demonstrate that in light of the delegation problem arising in domestic politics where voters 
strategically choose a representative with preferences potentially different from their own, the 
presumed oversupply of defensive counter-terrorism measures by countries is curtailed.2 
 
There have also been numerous works dealing with the co-ordination problem faced by 
countries when faced with a common terrorist threat. Arce and Sandler (2005) and Sandler 
(2005) demonstrate the rationale behind each country favoring defensive measures over 
offensive ones, relying on the nature of externalities generated on others by the type of measures 
implemented by a country. Das and Roy Chowdhury (2014) apply a game-theoretic model to 
identify circumstances which may render it logical to respond to increased terrorism with 
increased pre-emption. Analyzing a framework where the targeted country has interests both at 
                                                          
1 Siqueira and Sandler (2007) also model the delegation problem arising in domestic politics, to derive similar 
results. 
2 See Mesquita (2005) for a model which incorporates moral hazard and learning, to illustrate the dynamics between 
the government and former terrorists. 
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home and abroad, Sandler and Siqueira (2006) show that leader-follower behavior reduces the 
inefficiency in deterrence while worsening the inefficiency in pre-emption, compared with the 
choices in the equilibrium with simultaneous moves. Bandyopadhyay and Sandler (2011) use a 
two-stage game involving two commonly targeted countries to demonstrate that market failures 
related to preemption and defense may be collectively mitigated by a handicapped defender. 
 
Countering the scourge of terrorism effectively, however, necessitates an understanding 
of the organizational structure of terror modules, each operating in multiple hubs through the 
establishment of a network of terror cells. The present work is cognizant of this, and investigates 
the nature of the interplay between preemption and defense in CT within a single-defender 
framework, by focusing on the role of information available with the terrorists and counter-
terrorists, and potential divergences in target preferences between the two sides. This is a major 
departure from the existent literature which, in its focus on multi-country/multi-defender 
frameworks and the associated issue of co-ordination against a common terrorist threat, largely 
ignores the salient impacts of information and varying perceptions about target-values even in 
the absence of co-ordination related dynamics. 
 
Enders and Jindapon (2010) compare alternative network structures of terror outfits – 
centralized and decentralized – and conclude that because the individual nodes in the latter 
structure may not make optimal decisions from the group’s standpoint, “the decentralized 
decision-making process is suboptimal from the overall perspective of the network”. However, 
with the increased surveillance of the activities of a terror outfit and the purposeful targeting of 
its leadership, survival may have to be prioritized by the outfit rather than organizational 
efficiency, thereby forcing it to rely on a decentralized network. Such a trade-off between outfit-
safety and intra-outfit correspondence is modeled by Enders and Su (2007), to establish the 
rationale for the formation of terror cells, which are the smallest units of decentralized networks 
of terrorists. 
 
A terror cell or terrorist cell comprises of a small and cohesive group of usually three to 
five members. According to The Free Dictionary by Farlex, ensuring operational safety generally 
requires that adjoining terror cells be unaware of one another or the headship’s identity. Different 
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terror cells operating in a hub may be assigned specialized roles in enabling the smooth 
execution of a terror attack. Planning or support or logistics cells are responsible for fund-raising 
and provision of logistical support to execution cells. Sleeper or submarine or dormant cells may 
have resided in the target country for years, living like normal residents until activated. 
Execution cells enter the fray right towards the end, utilizing the resources and intelligence 
provided by other cells to conduct the attack.3 
 
The following analysis seeks to provide insights regarding the optimal utilization of 
limited resources in thwarting the ability of terror cells to carry out an attack, in a situation where 
time is of the essence. Therefore, the scenario discussed is likely to describe a situation in which 
the planning and support cells have already played their part, all concerned sleeper cells have 
been activated, and the execution cells have entered the fray. Hence to prevent the attack, it 
would be necessary to either apprehend or eliminate the execution cells before they conduct the 
attack, or to correctly predict the intended target and provide it protection. The present study 
intends to compare the optimal resource allocation between attacking the possible hideouts of the 
terror cell and protecting its potential targets, under different scenarios in respect of the 
observability of protection afforded to the potential targets, and the ability of the terror cells to 
distinguish between the values of different targets. 
 
According to Mueller et al. (2006), preemption is probable if adequate intelligence about 
the terrorists’ names, whereabouts, or designs is obtainable. It is, however, important to note that 
not only is the quantum of intelligence per se, important in determining its actionability (whether 
preemption or protection is optimal), but also the quality and nature of inputs. For example, more 
specific intelligence about the potential whereabouts of the cell drastically reduces the number of 
potential hideouts which would need to be raided if preemption is chosen, thereby making 
preemption more likely ceteris paribus. Conversely, if the inputs are more specific about 
potential targets of the outfit, then defense becomes more attractive ceteris paribus. This aspect 
is captured in our framework, and is usually critical in determining the equilibrium allocation of 
CT resources between offence and defense. 
 
                                                          
3 Slate (2001). 
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A retired Commander from the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, Sid Heal (2011) 
classifies defensive actions such as vigilance instillation, threat identification, target protection, 
attack forecasting and damage control under the head of anti-terrorism (AT), and the endeavors 
applied to resist terrorists and determinedly prevent terror strikes under the head of counter-
terrorism. He concludes that effectively tackling terrorism necessitates the application of both 
AT and CT. However, our findings suggest that while some amount of allocation to defense is 
usually optimal, pre-emptive measures may or may not be employed. 
 
In similar vein, Das and Lahiri (2017) construct a three-period game where the terrorists 
use terror as a means to an end, and neither the State nor the terrorists are completely aware of 
the other’s preferences. Hence, they conclude, it is impossible for the State to triumph in the war 
on terror using preemption alone, if the marginal cost of preemption is rising. Although our 
framework focuses on countering the threat posed by a terror cell, and not on a full-blown war on 
terror, its robustness lies in its ability to demonstrate the strong rationale underlying the above-
stated impossibility theorem under different scenarios in respect of the conspicuity of CT target 
valuations and defensive allocation to the terror cell. 
 
Bier, Oliveros and Samuelson (2007) allow for a divergence of preferences over targets 
between the defender and attacker such that the defender does not know the attacker’s 
preferences, while the attacker observes the defender’s resource allocation. Under these 
assumptions, they demonstrate that the defender prefers her allocation to be public rather than 
private. Our study, considers a similar scenario with diverging preferences, but with two key 
differences. Firstly, our structure allows for pre-emptive strikes against the terror cell (attacker) 
and secondly, the cell’s preferences are common knowledge. Under these assumptions, we show 
that the optimal CT allocation under diverging preferences is at least as offensive as that under 
identical preferences, and the expected damage that the terrorists can cause under the diverging 
preferences does not exceed that under the identical preferences. 
 
The present paper, under different assumptions relating to the observability of target 
valuations and protection (defensive allocation), attempts to study and compare the nature of 
optimal resource allocations between offence and defense. It demonstrates that if target 
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valuations from the CT point-of-view cannot be observed by the cell, then the optimal allocation 
is at least as offensive if the terror cell can observe which targets are protected, than if it cannot. 
Moreover, it is shown that the terror cell’s ability to inflict damage is least when it can neither 
distinguish between target values nor observe target protection, and most when it can observe 
both target values and protection. 
  
In Section 2, we provide the basic model and results, given the valuations of the targets. 
Section 3 addresses the possibility of the terror cell having different target valuations than those 
from the CT perspective. Section 4 summarizes and discusses the implications of the results. All 
proofs and calculations are relegated to the appendices. 
 
 
2.  Model 
 
Consider a terror cell located in a specified geographic area, having 𝑀 possible hideouts 
and 𝑁 potential targets 𝑇1, 𝑇2,…., 𝑇𝑁. Let the values of these targets be 𝑣1, 𝑣2,…., 𝑣𝑁 
respectively from the CT standpoint, such that 𝑣1 > 𝑣2 > ⋯ > 𝑣𝑁. These valuations may or may 
not be known to the cell. Suppose the cell requires only one hideout, and has the capability to 
attack only a single target. Let 𝑅 be the CT resource endowment, the cost of pre-emptively 
attacking any hideout be unity (numeraire)4, and 𝛼 be the cost of defending any potential target. 
We assume 𝑅 < 𝑀 and 𝑅 < 𝛼𝑁, so that the CT resource endowment is such that neither can all 
possible hideouts be attacked, nor can all potential targets be defended. Then, if 𝑚 and 𝑛 denote 
the number of possible hideouts pre-emptively attacked and the number of potential targets 
defended respectively, the CT budget constraint is 
                                𝑅 = 𝑚 + 𝑛𝛼                        (1) 
 
 The CT objective is to minimize the expected damage inflicted by the terror cell, by 
choosing 𝑚 and 𝑛 subject to (1). The terror cell’s objective is just the converse, which is to 
inflict the maximum possible damage by choosing an appropriate target. We assume that if the 
correct hideout is attacked pre-emptively, the terror cell is neutralized before it can carry out an 
                                                          
4 Hence 𝛼, in effect, is the CT cost of defense relative to the CT cost of attack. 
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attack, and the game ends. Otherwise, the cell conducts an attack on its chosen target. If the 
designated target is protected, the attack is foiled. If not, the attack succeeds. Moreover, the 
structure of the strategic interaction is assumed to be common knowledge. We consider the 
following scenarios: 
1. Cell can observe neither target values, nor target protection, 
2. Cell can observe target protection, but not target values, and 
3. Cell can observe both target values and target protection. 
 
Proposition 1: The optimal CT allocation is at least as offensive in Scenario 2, as it is in 
Scenario 1. 
 
The proof of the proposition is given in Appendix 1. Proposition 1 is a direct consequence of the 
fact that when target valuation is inconspicuous, if the target protection can be observed by the 
cell (Scenario 2), then the ability to defend against a terror strike effectively is compromised 
compared to the case where target protection is inconspicuous (Scenario 1). This is because if 
target protection is conspicuous to the cell, it will not attack a protected target if it survives the 
pre-emptive strikes. This ensures a successful terror attack if the cell survives the pre-emptive 
strikes because, by assumption, the CT resource endowment is not large enough to protect all 
targets. It is for this reason that pre-emptively attacking hideouts has greater appeal in Scenario 
2. 
 
Proposition 2: Expected damage is highest in Scenario 3, and lowest in Scenario 1. 
 
The proof is outlined in Appendix 2. In Scenario 1, even if the outfit survives pre-emptive CT 
strikes, it may end up attacking a defended target due to lack of information on target protection. 
In Scenarios 2 and 3, such an outfit (which has survived pre-emptive CT strikes) would 
successfully carry out an attack because target protection is conspicuous. Moreover, in Scenario 
3, the outfit would successfully be able to attack the most valuable unprotected target, because it 
can observe the values of different targets in addition to the protection afforded to each of them. 
Proposition 2 follows as a consequence. 
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 This result is in sharp contrast to Bier, Oliveros and Samuelson (2007), who argue that 
making the defensive allocation public may be in the defender’s interests. Their result, however, 
is obtained by assuming that the attacker (the terror cell, in the present framework) has a non-
trivial outside option. If there is no such alternative avenue which can yield higher utility to the 
terrorists, as in our model, then Proposition 2 holds. The absence of such an outside option is in 
fact a reasonable assumption under the circumstances considered here, given that terror cells can 
seldom be deactivated at such an advanced stage of a terrorist operation, such as one where the 
execution cells have already entered the picture. 
 
The proposition below rationalizes the ubiquity of defensive CT allocation in real-world 
scenarios. 
 
Proposition 3: Let ?̃?(≤ [
𝑅
𝛼
]) be a finite number of targets (from the set of all valuable targets 
arranged in descending order by value, starting from the most valuable) with cumulative value 
?̃?, and 𝑚∗ be the optimal number of potential hideouts to be pre-emptively attacked from the CT 
standpoint. Let the cumulative value of the remaining targets be 𝑣, so that ∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑣𝑖
?̃?
𝑖=1 +
∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=?̃?+1 = ?̃? + 𝑣. If 
?̃?
?̂?
 is high enough, then 𝑚∗ < 𝑅 in Scenarios 1 and 2. Also, if 
𝑣1
𝑣?̃?+1
 is high 
enough, then 𝑚∗ < 𝑅 in Scenario 3. 
 
The proof of the proposition is given in Appendix 3. In scenarios where target values are 
inconspicuous to the cell, if the targets in a particular subset of targets of value (arranged in 
descending order, starting from the most valuable) can be protected given the CT resources 
available, then if the subset is valuable enough compared to its complement, allocating at least 
some part of the CT resources to defense is optimal. This is because the opportunity cost of not 
protecting targets which are very valuable compared to other targets, and which can be protected, 
is very high. To understand this, note that even given a higher CT allocation to offence at the 
cost of leaving some of such high-value targets unprotected, the cost that the terror cell can 
inflict if it survives the pre-emptive strikes is prohibitively high, thereby making such an 
allocation very risky. This ensures the absence of all-out offence in equilibrium. In Scenario 3, a 
similar result intuitively follows if the value of the most valuable target is sufficiently higher 
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than the value of the most valuable target in the complement of the subset, since target values are 
conspicuous to the cell in addition to target protection. To understand this, note that if 𝑇1 and 
other targets of very high value compared to 𝑇?̃?+1 are not protected for example, then once again 
we have the possibility of the terror cell inflicting prohibitively high damage if it escapes the pre-
emptive strikes. In fact, the opportunity cost here is even higher than that in Scenarios 1 and 2 
because both target protection and target values are conspicuous to the cell, thereby ensuring that 
it will attack the most valuable unprotected target on surviving the pre-emptive strikes.5 
 
The omnipresence of defensive measures in combating terrorists, indicated by 
Proposition 3, is in similar flavor to a significant body of existing literature on terrorism. 
Although under different frameworks and assumptions than ours, the anecdotal evidence in Heal 
(2011), the three-stage game characterization of a country’s war on terror in Das and Lahiri 
(2017), etc., all point towards the critical role of defensive CT. 
 
We now illustrate the above-stated propositions by constructing numerical examples. We 
fix the values of various parameters to check the results. Detailed calculations are relegated to 
Appendix 4. 
 
Example 1: Let 𝑁 = 4, 𝛼 = 2, 𝑅 = 4 and 𝑀 = 5 with (𝑣1, 𝑣2, 𝑣3, 𝑣4) = (40, 7, 6, 5), then a 
unique interior solution is obtained in Cases 1 and 3 with 𝑛∗ = 1 and 𝑚∗ = 2, whereas a unique 
corner solution is obtained in Case 2, where resources are only spent on pre-emptively striking 
the potential terror hideouts, i.e., 𝑛∗ = 0 and 𝑚∗ = 4. Also, the expected damage caused by the 
terror cell in Cases 1, 2 and 3 are 2.7, 2.9 and 4.2 respectively. It is immediately evident, 
therefore, that the results are in conformity with Propositions 1 and 2. Moreover, if 𝑣1 = 200 
instead of the earlier 𝑣1 = 40, then the optimal values of 𝑛 and 𝑚 remain unchanged in Cases 1 
and 3, but 𝑛∗ = 1 and 𝑚∗ = 2 in Case 2, instead of 𝑛∗ = 0 and 𝑚∗ = 4. The results, therefore, 
are also in conformity with Proposition 3. 
 
Example 2: Now consider the case where 𝑁 = 3, 𝛼 = 2, 𝑅 = 4 and 𝑀 = 5 with (𝑣1, 𝑣2, 𝑣3) =
(40, 7, 6). A corner solution is obtained in Case 1, where all CT resources are used for defense, 
                                                          
5 This is in accordance with Proposition 2. 
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i.e., 𝑛∗ = 2 and 𝑚∗ = 0. The other corner solution is obtained in Case 2, with all CT resources 
used for offence, i.e., 𝑛∗ = 0 and 𝑚∗ = 4. Finally, a unique interior solution is obtained in Case 
3, with 𝑛∗ = 1 and 𝑚∗ = 2. Also, the expected damage caused by the terror cell in Cases 1, 2 
and 3 are 2, 3.5 and 4.2 respectively. It is immediately evident, therefore, that the results are in 
conformity with Propositions 1 and 2. Moreover, if 𝑣1 = 200 instead of the earlier 𝑣1 = 40, then 
the optimal values of 𝑛 and 𝑚 remain unchanged in Cases 1 and 3, but 𝑛∗ = 1 and 𝑚∗ = 2 in 
Case 2, instead of 𝑛∗ = 0 and 𝑚∗ = 4. The results, therefore, are also in compliance with 
Proposition 3. 
 
 
3. Differing Valuations 
 
 In this situation, we consider the possibility that the terror cell’s target valuations may 
differ from those of the CT authorities. However, the valuations of the terror cell are assumed to 
be common knowledge. We also assume that the protection afforded to the targets is common 
knowledge. 
 
For the targets 𝑇1, 𝑇2,…., 𝑇𝑁; let the cell’s valuations be 𝑉1, 𝑉2,…., 𝑉𝑁 where 𝑉1 > 𝑉2 >
⋯ > 𝑉𝑁. Let 𝑣1, 𝑣2,…., 𝑣𝑁 be the CT authority’s valuations. If all CT resources are allocated to 
defense, then let 𝑆0 be the set of targets defended if defensive allocation is granted in descending 
order of the terror cell’s target valuations. It is reasonable to defend targets in descending order 
of valuation, since the cost of defending each target is the same and equal to 𝛼, and therefore the 
CT focus will be on defending more valuable targets first. So, 𝑆0 = {𝑇1, 𝑇2, … , 𝑇[𝑅
𝛼
]
}, where [
𝑅
𝛼
] is 
the largest integer in 
𝑅
𝛼
. Given the CT budget if 𝑆0 is protected, the cell will attack 𝑇[𝑅
𝛼
]+1
, 
inflicting damage worth 𝑣
[
𝑅
𝛼
]+1
. Let 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑆0  be the least valuable target in 𝑆 from a CT standpoint, 
i.e., 𝑣𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑆0 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑣𝑖, for all 𝑇𝑖 ∈ 𝑆0. Now construct the set 𝑆1 ⊆ 𝑆0, with targets in descending 
order of the terror cell’s valuations up to the target 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛−1
𝑆0 . So, 𝑆1 = {𝑇1, 𝑇2, … , 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛−1
𝑆0 }. Let 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑆1  
be the least valuable target in 𝑆1 from a CT standpoint, i.e., 𝑣𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑆1 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑣𝑖 , for all 𝑇𝑖 ∈ 𝑆1. Let 
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the cardinality of 𝑆1 be 𝑛1, that is, 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛−1
𝑆0 = 𝑇𝑛1. In this way, we can define 𝑆𝑟, 𝑟 = 0, 1, 2, ... 
There are the following two possibilities: 
 
Case 1: 𝑣𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑆0 < 𝑣
[
𝑅
𝛼
]+1
. 
This ensures that defending 𝑆0 is not optimal from a CT standpoint because if 𝑆1 is protected 
instead, the expected damage will be (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛1
𝑀
) 𝑣𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑆0 < 𝑣
[
𝑅
𝛼
]+1
. Construct 𝑆2 =
{𝑇1, 𝑇2, … , 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛−1
𝑆1 }, where the cardinality of 𝑆2 is 𝑛2, that is, 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛−1
𝑆1 = 𝑇𝑛2. Compared to 
defending 𝑆1, 𝑛1 − 𝑛2 additional targets are left undefended if 𝑆2 is defended. This leads to an 
incremental CT resource-saving of 𝛼(𝑛1 − 𝑛2), which can be utilized to preemptively attack 
𝛼(𝑛1 − 𝑛2) additional potential hideouts. Since it is optimal to defend fewer than the [
𝑅
𝛼
] targets 
in 𝑆0, the optimal number of targets to defend must be a subset of 𝑆1. This is because the best 
way to defend fewer targets than in 𝑆0, must begin with leaving 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑆0  unprotected. This would 
therefore become the most valuable undefended target from the cell’s perspective. However, all 
targets in 𝑆0 following 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑆0 , that is, 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛+1
𝑆0 , 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛+2
𝑆0 , … , 𝑇
[
𝑅
𝛼
]
, are less valuable for the cell than 
𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑆0 . Hence, these can be left undefended without any additional risk, since the terror cell’s 
optimal target choice would remain 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑆0 . Moreover, it costs 𝛼 to defend each of these targets. 
Therefore, the resources saved can be utilized for preemptively striking potential hideouts. 
Hence, if defending 𝑆0 is not optimal, then the set of optimally defended targets should either be 
𝑆1, or a proper subset of 𝑆1. Similarly, it can be shown that if it is optimal to defend any fewer 
than the 𝑛1 targets in 𝑆1, then the optimal number of targets to defend must be a subset of 𝑆2, and 
so on. So the change in expected damage at the margin, on defending 𝑆2 instead of 𝑆1, is 𝐷2 =
(
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛2
𝑀
) 𝑣𝑛2+1 − (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛1
𝑀
) 𝑣𝑛1+1.
6 If 𝐷2 ≥ 0, then it is optimal to defend 𝑆1. Otherwise, we 
construct 𝑆3 = {𝑇1, 𝑇2, … , 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛−1
𝑆2 }, where the cardinality of 𝑆3 is 𝑛3, that is, 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛−1
𝑆2 = 𝑇𝑛3. Then 
we check whether 𝐷3 = (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛3
𝑀
) 𝑣𝑛3+1 − (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛2
𝑀
) 𝑣𝑛2+1, is non-negative or not, and so on. 
For some integer 𝑟, if 𝐷1,…, 𝐷𝑟 are negative but 𝐷𝑟+1 ≥ 0, then it is optimal to defend 𝑆𝑟. Here, 
                                                          
6 The expression for 𝐷1, the marginal expected damage on defending 𝑆1 instead of 𝑆0, is given in Case 2 below. 
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𝐷𝑟+1 = (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛𝑟+1
𝑀
) 𝑣𝑛𝑟+1+1 − (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛𝑟
𝑀
) 𝑣𝑛𝑟+1, ∀𝑟: 0 < 𝑟 < [
𝑅
𝛼
]. If 𝐷1,…, 𝐷[𝑅
𝛼
]
 are all 
negative, however, then it is optimal to allocate all resources towards offence. 
 
Case 2: 𝑣𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑆0 > 𝑣
[
𝑅
𝛼
]+1
. 
In this case, from the CT perspective, the least valuable target in 𝑆0 is more valuable than the 
most valuable target outside 𝑆0 from the terror cell’s perspective. Hence, if defending all targets 
in 𝑆0 is suboptimal from a CT standpoint, then the set of optimally defended targets should either 
be 𝑆1, or a proper subset of 𝑆1.
7 The change in expected damage at the margin, on defending 𝑆1 
instead of 𝑆0, is 𝐷1 = (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛1
𝑀
) 𝑣𝑛1+1 − (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼[𝑅 𝛼⁄ ]
𝑀
) 𝑣
[
𝑅
𝛼
]+1
. If 𝐷1 ≥ 0, then 𝑆0 is the set of 
optimally defended targets. Else, we check the sign of 𝐷2, and so on. In general, for some integer 
𝑟 𝜖 [0, [
𝑅
𝛼
]), if 𝐷0,…, 𝐷𝑟 are negative but 𝐷𝑟+1 ≥ 0, then it is optimal to defend 𝑆𝑟. If 𝐷1,…, 𝐷[𝑅
𝛼
]
 
are all negative, then as in Case 1, it is optimal to allocate all resources towards offence. 
 
Special Cases: 
1. Suppose all targets are valued identically from a CT perspective, that is, 𝑣1 = 𝑣2 = ⋯ =
𝑣𝑁 = 𝑣 (say). Then if the terror cell is able to conduct a successful attack on any 
undefended target, the damage would be the same, that is 𝑣. Hence, defending any 
particular subset of targets is suboptimal, since the cell can observe the CT defensive 
allocation. Therefore, the optimal allocation is to allocate all CT resources to 
preemptively striking potential hideouts of the terror cell, that is (𝑚∗, 𝑛∗) = (𝑅, 0). This 
is because a) there are not enough resources to defend all of the equally valuable targets, 
and b) the damage is limited to 𝑣 if the cell manages to survive the preemptive strikes. 
2. Suppose the valuation-ranking of the targets from the CT standpoint is the same as that 
from the cell’s perspective, that is, 𝑣1 > 𝑣2 > ⋯ > 𝑣𝑁. If an interior solution exists 
(where some targets are defended as well as some potential hideouts are preemptively 
attacked), then the defensive CT allocation is afforded in descending order of value to 
targets starting from the most valuable, till the marginal utility from defense continues to 
exceed that from preemptive strikes. 
                                                          
7 This is as discussed in Case 1. 
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3. Suppose the target valuation ranking from the CT perspective, is diametrically opposite 
to that of the terror cell, that is, 𝑣1 < 𝑣2 < ⋯ < 𝑣𝑁. If the cell survives the preemptive 
strikes, then it would optimally attack the least valuable target from the CT perspective 
(𝑇1), since this is the most valuable target from the cell’s perspective. So limited CT 
resources need not be spent protecting other targets. Moreover, there is no CT incentive 
in changing the cell’s target choice by protecting its most valuable target (𝑇𝑁), since this 
is the least valuable target from the CT standpoint. Hence the optimal CT allocation, as 
when all targets are equally valuable from a CT standpoint, is to use all CT resources for 
preemptively attacking potential terror hideouts. So, (𝑚∗, 𝑛∗) = (𝑅, 0). 
 
In addition to the above extreme cases, we conclude this section with a stronger assertion 
comparing the cases of identical valuations and differing valuations of potential targets, stated in 
the proposition below. 
 
Proposition 4: Suppose the target valuation ranking of the terror cell is different from the CT 
ranking, target protection is conspicuous to the terror cell, and these are common knowledge. 
Then the optimal CT allocation is at least as offensive as the case with identical valuation 
rankings. Moreover, the expected damage does not exceed that in the case with identical 
valuation rankings. 
 
The result is novel, and it draws from the three special cases mentioned above. The formal proof 
is in Appendix 5. If the target valuation rankings differ, the CT authorities may not have to 
defend certain targets which they would have to under identical preferences, given their own 
preferences across targets. This is because these targets may not be valuable enough any longer, 
from a CT perspective. And any resources saved as a result can be optimally utilized for pre-
emptive strikes on potential hideouts, thereby entailing a CT allocation which is at least as 
offensive as that under identical valuation rankings, and with expected damage that is no greater 
than that under identical rankings. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
The present analysis attempts to derive insights regarding the optimal utilization of 
limited CT resources, to counter terror cells, in scenarios where time is of the essence in being 
able to thwart a successful attack by the terrorist(s). Since the decision to conduct an attack has 
been taken at an earlier stage, which is not within the scope of this study, it is taken as a fait 
accompli. Consequently, it is observed that in scenarios where the cell is better informed about 
the targets, the cell is at least as lethal as in scenarios where it has less information about the 
targets.8 Hence, there appears to be a CT rationale for suppressing target information from the 
terror cell, by making target protection wholly or partially inconspicuous for example. In reality 
however, the ability to suppress target information may be costly, and therefore not achievable to 
the desired extent. Also, if better intelligence for CT is available in respect of the possible 
hideouts, as characterized by a lower number of possible hideouts (𝑀) for example, then pre-
emptive strikes become more attractive. This is along the lines of Mueller et al. (2006), as 
alluded to in the introduction. For a framework which determines intelligence endogenously, see 
Arce and Sandler (2007). The study characterizes terrorist attacks as signals, where the 
government is uncertain whether it is confronted by a politically motivated or a militant outfit, in 
order to illustrate the possibility of ex-post regret and the consequent value of intelligence in CT. 
 
The findings of this paper must be viewed in the backdrop of the lack of analyses of 
counter-terrorism frameworks in general, and terror cells in particular, with specific focus on 
comparison of different scenarios in terms of the conspicuity of target information. This is 
despite the existence of a sizeable literature on the broad topic of terrorism, addressing a myriad 
of issues ranging from the linkages of terrorism to income, geography and politico-economic 
structures, to the problem of co-ordination failure encountered by countries in the provision of 
counter-terrorism effort when faced with a common terrorist threat. For instance, the third 
proposition must be viewed in context of the widespread finding that in the event of almost any 
terrorist threat, protection is afforded to at least a few potential targets of high enough value. This 
result provides a theoretical foundation for the ubiquity of defensive measures in countering 
                                                          
8 The present study therefore illustrates the importance of intelligence regarding the potential targets, in determining 
the lethality of the terror cell.  
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terror cells, under different assumptions relating to the conspicuity of target information. This is 
along the lines of Das and Lahiri (2017), who demonstrate a similar result in the context of a 
State-waged anti-terror campaign. 
 
Proposition 3 also provides an insight into why the allocation of CT resources may be 
suboptimal from a social perspective, if the number of persons (potential targets) accorded VIP 
status (high value from the State’s perspective) is large. The consequent allocation would tend to 
divert valuable CT resources to VIP protection, rather than their optimal use in pre-emptive 
actions against the terror cell, for example. Such allocational inefficiencies are seemingly linked 
to the kind of delegation problem arising in domestic politics discussed in Sandler and Siqueira 
(2007) and Siqueira and Sandler (2007). Similarly, CT allocation in an egalitarian society may be 
more offensive than in a society where there is a minority elite section co-existing with less-
privileged masses. 
 
Finally, and most interestingly, the present work provides the rationale for and 
demonstrates the greater offensive orientation of CT policy, when the CT preferences over the 
potential targets diverge from those of the terror cell. The framework improves upon that applied 
by Bier, Oliveros and Samuelson (2007) by providing an additional CT policy lever. This is 
achieved by allowing for the possibility of conducting pre-emptive strikes on the potential 
hideouts of the terror cell. This is, in fact, the crucial feature which enables the current structure 
to demonstrate the increased effectiveness of offensive counter-terrorism under diverging target 
preferences. An interesting extension would be to check the robustness of this result in a scenario 
where the preferences of the terrorists are their private information. 
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1 
 
In order to prove the first two propositions we characterize a strictly decreasing and 
differentiable target valuation function 𝑣(. ), 𝑣′(. ) < 0, defined over the interval [0, 𝑁]. Let 𝑛1
∗ 
and 𝑛2
∗  be the optimal CT choices in Scenarios 1 and 2, respectively. In Scenario 1, the terror cell 
neither knows the target values, nor can it observe which targets are protected. So it randomly 
selects a target. Hence, in order to minimize the expected damage, the authorities will protect the 
highest-value targets – 1 to 𝑛. If the cell attacks any of these 𝑛 protected targets, then there is no 
damage because the attack will be thwarted. So the expected damage when the cell randomly 
chooses a target from the set of all 𝑁 targets, is (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛
𝑀
)
1
𝑁
∫ 𝑣(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑁
𝑛
, where (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛
𝑀
) is the 
probability that the cell survives the pre-emptive CT strike on hideouts, and 
1
𝑁
∫ 𝑣(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑁
𝑛
 is the 
expected damage from a terror strike if the cell randomizes over all targets of value. The 
derivative of the expected damage with respect to 𝑛 is 
1
𝑁
{
𝛼
𝑀
∫ 𝑣(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑁
𝑛
− (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛
𝑀
) 𝑣(𝑛)} ≡ 𝐶1. 
To ensure that the second order condition (SOC) for convexity holds over the interval of feasible 
n, we assume 
1
𝑁𝑀
[−2𝛼𝑣(𝑛) − (𝑀 − 𝑅 + 𝛼𝑛)𝑣′(𝑛)] > 0 for all 𝑛 ɛ [0, 𝑅 𝛼⁄ ]. 
 
In Scenario 2, since the terror cell can observe target protection but is again unable to 
distinguish between target values, the authorities once again optimally protect the highest-value 
targets – 1 to 𝑛. However, unlike in Scenario 1, the cell randomizes only over the remaining 𝑁 −
𝑛 unprotected targets. Hence, the expected damage is (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛
𝑀
)
1
𝑁−𝑛
∫ 𝑣(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑁
𝑛
, where 
1
𝑁−𝑛
∫ 𝑣(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑁
𝑛
 is the expected damage from a terror strike if the cell randomizes over all 
unprotected targets of value. The derivative of the expected damage with respect to 𝑛 is 
𝑁
𝑁−𝑛
𝐶1 +
𝑁
(𝑁−𝑛)2
(
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛
𝑀
)
1
𝑁
∫ 𝑣(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑁
𝑛
≡ 𝐶2 > 𝐶1. The SOC here is 
1
𝑀
[
2𝛼
(𝑁−𝑛)2
∫ 𝑣(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑁
𝑛
−
2𝛼
𝑁−𝑛
𝑣(𝑛) +
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛
(𝑁−𝑛)3
∫ 𝑣(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑁
𝑛
− 2
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛
(𝑁−𝑛)2
𝑣(𝑛) −
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛
𝑁−𝑛
𝑣′(𝑛)] > 0 for all 𝑛 ɛ [0, 𝑅 𝛼⁄ ]. If either 𝐶1 = 0 
or 𝐶2 = 0 in (0, 𝑅 𝛼⁄ ), then 𝑛1
∗ > 𝑛2
∗ . If 𝐶1 > 0 at 𝑛 = 0, then 𝐶2 > 𝐶1 > 0 at 𝑛 = 0 and hence 
𝑛1
∗ = 𝑛2
∗ = 0. If 𝐶2 < 0 at 𝑛 = 𝑅 𝛼⁄ , then 𝐶1 < 𝐶2 < 0 at 𝑛 = 𝑅 𝛼⁄  and hence 𝑛1
∗ = 𝑛2
∗ = 𝑅 𝛼⁄ . 
Finally, if 𝐶2 > 0 at 𝑛 = 0 and 𝐶1 < 0 at 𝑛 = 𝑅 𝛼⁄ , then 𝑛1
∗ = 0 < 𝑅 𝛼⁄ = 𝑛2
∗ . Hence the proof. 
            Q.E.D. 
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Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2 
 
 The expected damage in Scenario 3 is (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛
𝑀
) 𝑣(𝑛). Then comparing the expected 
damage under different scenarios, we get (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛
𝑀
) 𝑣(𝑛) > (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛
𝑀
)
1
𝑁−𝑛
∫ 𝑣(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑁
𝑛
>
(
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛
𝑀
)
1
𝑁
∫ 𝑣(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑁
𝑛
, the latter two terms being the expected damages in Scenarios 2 and 1, 
respectively. Hence the proof. 
            Q.E.D. 
 
 
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 3 
 
 Let ?̅? be the average value of all targets. Then ?̅? =
?̃?+?̂?
𝑁
. If the CT allocation is purely 
offensive, the expected damage is (
𝑀−𝑅
𝑀
) ?̅? = (
𝑀−𝑅
𝑀
)
?̃?+?̂?
𝑁
 in Scenarios 1 and 2, and (
𝑀−𝑅
𝑀
) 𝑣1 in 
Scenario 3. If, however, ?̃? targets are protected, then the expected damage is 
(
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼?̃?
𝑀
)
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=?̃?+1 = (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼?̃?
𝑀
)
?̂?
𝑁
 and (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼?̃?
𝑀
)
1
𝑁−?̃?
∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=?̃?+1 = (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼?̃?
𝑀
)
?̂?
𝑁−?̃?
 in 
Scenarios 1 and 2, respectively. Also, the expected damage is (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼?̃?
𝑀
) 𝑣?̃?+1 in Scenario 3. 
From the above, it is follows that the necessary and sufficient conditions for 𝑚∗ < 𝑅 to hold are 
?̃?
?̂?
>
𝛼?̃?
𝑀−𝑅
, 
?̃?
𝑉
>
1+
𝛼𝑁
𝑀−𝑅
𝑁
?̃?
−1
 and 
𝑣1
𝑣?̃?+1
> 1 +
𝛼?̃?
𝑀−𝑅
 in Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
            Q.E.D. 
Appendix 4: Calculations of the solutions of the examples in Section 3 
 
The expected damage in Case 1 is given by (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛
𝑀
)
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=𝑛+1 . Substituting 𝑁 = 4, 
𝛼 = 2, 𝑅 = 4 and 𝑀 = 5 with (𝑣1, 𝑣2, 𝑣3, 𝑣4) = (40, 7, 6, 5), the expected damage is: 
 
1
5
.
1
4
. 58 = 2.9, when 𝑛 = 0, 
 
3
5
.
1
4
. 18 = 2.7, when 𝑛 = 1, and 
 1.
1
4
. 11 = 2.75, when 𝑛 = 2. 
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Since the expected damage is lowest when 𝑛 = 1, it is the optimal choice. 
 
 The expected damage in Case 2 is given by (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛
𝑀
)
1
𝑁−𝑛
∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=𝑛+1 . Substituting 𝑁 = 4, 
𝛼 = 2, 𝑅 = 4 and 𝑀 = 5 with (𝑣1, 𝑣2, 𝑣3, 𝑣4) = (40, 7, 6, 5), the expected damage is: 
 
1
5
.
1
4
. 58 = 2.9, when 𝑛 = 0, 
 
3
5
.
1
3
. 18 = 3.6, when 𝑛 = 1, and 
 
1
2
. 11 = 5.5, when 𝑛 = 2. 
Since the expected damage is lowest when 𝑛 = 0, it is the optimal choice. 
 
 The expected damage in Case 3 is given by (
𝑀−𝑅+𝛼𝑛
𝑀
)
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=𝑛+1 . Substituting 𝑁 = 4, 
𝛼 = 2, 𝑅 = 4 and 𝑀 = 5 with (𝑣1, 𝑣2, 𝑣3, 𝑣4) = (40, 7, 6, 5), the expected damage is: 
 
1
5
. 40 = 8, when 𝑛 = 0, 
 
3
5
. 7 = 4.2, when 𝑛 = 1, and 
 6, when 𝑛 = 2. 
Since the expected damage is lowest when 𝑛 = 1, it is the optimal choice. The above results 
conform to Propositions 1 and 2. 
 
 On replacing 𝑣1 = 40 with 𝑣1 = 200, the expected damage in Case 1 is: 
 
1
5
.
1
4
. 218 = 10.9, when 𝑛 = 0, 
 
3
5
.
1
4
. 18 = 2.7, when 𝑛 = 1, and 
 1.
1
4
. 11 = 2.75, when 𝑛 = 2. 
Since the expected damage is lowest when 𝑛 = 1, it is still the optimal choice. 
 
On replacing 𝑣1 = 40 with 𝑣1 = 200, the expected damage in Case 2 is: 
 
1
5
.
1
4
. 218 = 10.9, when 𝑛 = 0, 
 
3
5
.
1
3
. 18 = 3.6, when 𝑛 = 1, and 
 
1
2
. 11 = 5.5, when 𝑛 = 2. 
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Since the expected damage is lowest when 𝑛 = 1, it is the optimal choice, instead of 𝑛 = 0 when 
𝑣1 = 40. It can also be easily verified that the optimal choice remains unchanged in Case 3, just 
as in Case 1. Hence, the results conform with Proposition 3. 
 
 The calculations for the case where 𝑁 = 3, 𝛼 = 2, 𝑅 = 4 and 𝑀 = 5 with (𝑣1, 𝑣2, 𝑣3) =
(40, 7, 6) is similar, and left to the interested reader. 
 
 
Appendix 5: Proof of Proposition 4 
 
 For the targets 𝑇1, 𝑇2,…., 𝑇𝑁; let the cell’s valuations be 𝑉1, 𝑉2,…., 𝑉𝑁 where 𝑉1 > 𝑉2 >
⋯ > 𝑉𝑁. Let 𝑣1, 𝑣2,…., 𝑣𝑁 be the CT authority’s valuations. 
 
Claim: 𝑆𝑟 ⊆ 𝑃𝑟 ≡ {𝑇1, 𝑇2, … . , 𝑇[𝑅
𝛼
]−𝑟
}, ∀𝑟 𝜖 [0, [
𝑅
𝛼
]), where 𝑟 is an integer. 
Proof: The claim obviously holds for 𝑟 = 0, since 𝑆0 ⊆ 𝑆0 = 𝑃0, because every set is a subset of 
itself. And by construction, for any 𝑟 𝜖 (0, [
𝑅
𝛼
]), 𝑇
[
𝑅
𝛼
]−𝑟+1
, 𝑇
[
𝑅
𝛼
]−𝑟+2
, … . , 𝑇
[
𝑅
𝛼
]
 must be excluded 
from 𝑆0 to obtain 𝑆𝑟. And hence follows the claim. 
 
 Suppose the CT valuations share the same ranking as the cell’s valuations, that is, 𝑣1 >
𝑣2 > ⋯ > 𝑣𝑁. Then 𝑆𝑟 = 𝑃𝑟 ∀𝑟 𝜖 [0, [
𝑅
𝛼
]), since no target other than 𝑇
[
𝑅
𝛼
]−𝑟+1
, 𝑇
[
𝑅
𝛼
]−𝑟+2
, … . , 𝑇
[
𝑅
𝛼
]
 
shall be excluded in order to obtain 𝑆𝑟 from 𝑆0. For some 𝑟𝜖 [0, [
𝑅
𝛼
]), if 𝑃𝑟 is optimally defended 
under identical rankings, then differing valuation rankings may enable additional targets 
belonging from 𝑃𝑟 to be left undefended if their CT value does not exceed 𝑣[𝑅
𝛼
]−𝑟+1
. In other 
words, these targets are being left undefended without any increase in the damage that the cell 
can inflict if it survives pre-emptive strikes. This, in fact, is how one arrives at 𝑆𝑟 from 𝑃𝑟. And 
any resources saved in this manner will be optimally utilized offensively. So the set of optimally 
defended targets under differing rankings must be a subset of 𝑆𝑟, which itself is a subset of 𝑃𝑟. 
Since 𝑟𝜖 [0, [
𝑅
𝛼
]) was chosen arbitrarily, it follows from the claim that the set of optimally 
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defended targets under differing valuation rankings is a subset of the set of optimally defended 
targets under identical rankings, and therefore the optimal CT allocation under differing 
valuation rankings is at least as offensive as that under identical rankings. 
 
Finally, it can easily be demonstrated that if all-out offence is optimal under 𝑣1 > 𝑣2 >
⋯ > 𝑣𝑁, then it must also be optimal under all other CT valuation orderings. This is left to the 
interested reader. 
 
Now we turn our attention to the expected damage. Suppose for some 𝑟𝜖 [0, [
𝑅
𝛼
]), 
defending 𝑃𝑟 is optimal under identical valuation rankings. Now consider the possibility of an 
arbitrary change in the CT valuation ranking. Now since 𝑆𝑟 (a subset of 𝑃𝑟) can be defended 
without risking higher damage if the cell survives pre-emptive strikes, and any resources so 
saved can be used for additional pre-emptive strikes, the probability of the outfit surviving the 
pre-emptive strikes shall be no greater than that when 𝑃𝑟 is defended. This ensures that the 
expected damage the terror cell can cause on defending 𝑆𝑟 does not exceed that on defending 𝑃𝑟. 
And as argued above, because the optimally defended set under differing allocations is a subset 
of 𝑆𝑟, the expected damage associated with this set does not exceed that associated with 
defending 𝑆𝑟. Since 𝑟𝜖 [0, [
𝑅
𝛼
]) was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that the expected damage under 
differing rankings does not exceed that under identical rankings. This completes the proof. 
Q.E.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
References 
 
Arce, Daniel G. and Sandler, Todd (2005): “Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis”, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 49 (2), 183-200. 
Arce, Daniel G. and Sandler, Todd (2007): “Terrorist Signalling and the Value of Intelligence”, British Journal of 
Political Science 37 (4), 573-586. 
Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu and Sandler, Todd (2011): “The Interplay Between Preemptive and Defensive 
Counterterrorism Measures: A Two-stage Game”, Economica 78, 546-564. 
Barth, James R.; Li, Tong and McCarthy, Don (2006): “Economic Impacts of Global Terrorism: From Munich to 
Bali”, Milken Institute Research Report. 
Bier, Vicki; Oliveros, Santiago and Samuelson, Larry (2007): “Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive 
Allocation against an Unknown Attacker”, Journal of Public Economic Theory 9(4), 563-587. 
Das, Satya P. and Lahiri, Sajal (2017): “Why Direct Counter-Terror (CT) Measures Only May Fail: An Analysis of 
Direct and Preventive CT Measures”, Preliminary Draft. 
Das, Satya P. and Roy Chowdhury, Prabal (2014): “Deterrence, Preemption and Panic: A Common-Enemy Problem 
of Terrorism”, Economic Enquiry 52 (1), 219-238. 
Enders, Walter and Jindapon, Paan (2010): “Network Externalities and the Structure of Terror Networks”, Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 54 (2), 262-280. 
Enders, Walter and Sandler, Todd (2006): “Distribution of Transnational Terrorism among Countries by Income 
Class and Geography after 9/11”, International Studies Quarterly 50 (2), 367-393. 
Enders, Walter and Su, Xuejuan (2007): “Rational Terrorists and Optimal Network Structure”, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 51 (1), 33-57. 
Heal, Sid (2011): “Anti-terrorism vs. Counter-terrorism”, The Tactical Edge, NTOA Publications, 68-70. 
Li, Quan (2005): “Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?”, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 49 (2), 278-297. 
Mesquita, Ethan Bueno de (2005): “The Terrorist Endgame: A Model with Moral Hazard and Learning”, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 49 (2), 237-258. 
Mueller, Karl P.; Castillo, Jasen J.; Morgan, Forrest E.; Pegahi, Negeen and Rosen, Brian (2006): “Striking First”, 
Project Air Force, RAND Corporation. 
Sandler, Todd (2005): “Collective versus Unilateral Responses to Terrorism”, Public Choice 124 (1/2), 75-93. 
Sandler, Todd and Siqueira, Kevin (2006): “Global Terrorism: Deterrence versus Pre-emption”, Canadian Journal 
of Economics 39 (4), 1370-1387. 
22 
 
Sandler, Todd and Siqueira, Kevin (2007): “Defensive Counterterrorism Measures and Domestic Politics”, Defence 
and Peace Economics 19 (6), 405-413. 
Siqueira, Kevin and Sandler, Todd (2007): “Terrorist Backlash, Terrorism Mitigation, and Policy Delegation”, 
Journal of Public Economics 91 (9), 1800-1815. 
Slate (2001): “How Do Terrorist “Cells” Work?”, www.slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/12/today-in-conservative-
media-how-obama-colluded-with-russia-and-iran.html. 
The Free Dictionary by Farlex: “Terrorist Cell”, www.thefreedictionary.com/terrorist+cell. 
